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Abstract— Nowadays critical IT infrastructures constitute the 
pillars of our economy. Being able to react quickly and in real 
time is a crucial challenge for the security officers in charge of 
maintaining those infrastructures operationally. Our state of 
the art in this field has highlighted that many architectures 
exist to dynamically support the reaction after the detection of 
an incident infrastructure. Those architectures are mostly 
elaborated based on a multi-agent system approach that offers 
the possibility to work in a decentralized and heterogeneous 
environment. However, in the meantime, we have observed 
that those architectures are based on a static assignment of 
functions to agents and that, as a consequence, isolating an 
agent or breaking the communication channel between two of 
them could create serious damage on the management of the 
crisis. In this paper, we propose an innovative approach for 
making the assignment of functions to agents in the critical 
architecture dynamic. Our approach exploits the concept of 
agent responsibility that we assign dynamically to those agents 
depending on the crisis type and severity. Simultaneously we 
explain the dynamic assignment of the access rights necessary 
to perform the obligation linked to these new responsibilities. 
This dynamic assignment of responsibilities is illustrated based 
on the architecture defined in the ReD project. 
Keywords: access right, security, multi agent system, crisis 
management reaction architecture, agent responsibility. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Responsibilities and access rights management in critical 
infrastructures are crucial activities in order to avoid security 
failures [1]. Those critical infrastructures are defined by (i) 
the importance of the services that they furnish to society, 
like for instance power distribution, telecommunication, 
health rescue, or specific administrative resources and (ii) the 
dependability between two or more of those services. 
In our previous work [2, 3], we have defined a security 
decision-reaction architecture for heterogeneous distributed 
network. This architecture was firstly composed of a Multi-
Agent System (MAS) that offers the advantage to react 
quickly and efficiently to an attack while being adapted for 
heterogeneous and distributed networks, and secondly of a 
decision support system that helps agents to make decisions 
based on utility preference values. The preference choice is 
achieved by taking uncertainty into account through 
Bayesian networks and influence diagrams. These main 
architecture objectives provide the logical and technological 
bases for the monitoring and for the reaction after the 
occurrence of an incident on the network. Although it 
permits to cover the entire conceptual layer from the incident 
detection at the very low technical layer up to the escalation 
of the incident to upper layer based on the decision 
mechanisms, our solution did not consider the normative 
specifications related to the responsibilities and 
accountability of the agents involved in it (including the 
technical and the human agents), and did not provide the 
possibility of adapting the agent responsibility during the 
occurrence of a crisis. 
In this paper, we propose to face that problem by 
enhancing the architecture with a dynamic assignment of 
responsibility to agents. Introducing the agent responsibility 
is a relevant topic because it permits to address many 
challenges at the same time: (i) agents are either human or 
software (ii), agents are issued from different fields (telecom, 
power distribution, etc.) and applications (iii) agents’ 
responsibilities in heterogeneous systems are formalized with 
responsibility models from those heterogeneous systems and 
consequently, a limitation of interoperability between those 
models may arise. 
To address that matter, we have enhanced the reaction 
architecture with a mechanism that permits to dynamically 
assign responsibility to agent and to modify the assignment 
according to crisis situations. 
In order to limit access to all information by all agents on 
the network, the access rights granted to the agents are 
dependent on their assigned responsibilities. 
The paper is structured as follows: the next section 
presents ReD [9], an agent based architecture to respond to 
incidents. Section III introduces the responsibility of agents 
and Section IV integrates that agent responsibility in ReD 
through a real case study. Finally the last section concludes 
the paper. 
II. REACTION ARCHITECTURE 
The reaction architecture presented in this section is 
based on the ReD project [4]. The ReD (Reaction after 
Detection) project defines and designs a solution to enhance 
the detection/reaction process and improves the overall 
resilience of IP networks. The architecture is composed of 
software components and of human agents that obligations 
concern the monitoring of the software component. 
The main components of the ReD architecture are: 
 PDP (Policy Decision Point) receives the new 
security policies and deploys them at the enforcement 
points (PEP); 
 Figure 1.  Synoptical ReD Architecture 
 PEP (Policy Enforcement Point) enforces the 
security policies provided by the PDP. 
 
Thanks to the JADE Multi-Agent System development 
framework [5, 6], communication between agents is made 
totally transparent. Fig. 1 highlights how the global 
architecture of ReD is implemented with UTOPIA (namely, 
ReDTopia) and combined with a Context Rights 
Management agent (CRM). This architecture will be used for 
the use case of the paper. 
Firstly, UTOPIA [7] is an insTitution Oriented 
ProgrammIng frAmework. UTOPIA aims at simplifying 
agent based institutions programming. For this work the use 
of UTOPIA enables us to tackle some lacks of ReD [8] by 
taking into account the state of the organization. In our 
context, the organization is considered as a set of actors who 
perform tasks and who can be grouped within a regulated 
structure and designed to achieve objectives and personal 
interests [11]. The second point concerns the Context Rights 
Management (CRM) agent who is in charge of providing 
rights to software agents (e.g.: PDP, PEP and Facilitator). 
Rights are dependent on the Context Manager of UTOPIA. 
For this, the CRM uses the rights and the crisis context 
database. The role of these databases is discussed in more 
detail later in section III. 
III. AGENT RESPONSIBILITY SPECIFICATION 
A. Contextual agent responsibility 
Mostly two agents are concerned by the access right 
function: the agents who provide the rights at the access right 
management layer and the agents who receive the rights at 
the operation layer. In a non-crisis context, agents are 
assigned to responsibilities like PEP, PDP, CRM, etc. Those 
assignments of responsibilities to agents require specific 
access rights. By analyzing for instance the activity of 
monitoring the network (see Fig. 1), we observe that this 
activity is handled by a human agent: the network 
monitoring employee that is helped by software agents 
(assigned PEP) who are intelligent probes which analyze the 
data flow on the file servers, the firewalls and the LDAP. In 
a non-crisis context, the intelligent probes have the 
responsibility to collect data, to make a basic correlation 
between the flows and the antecedent flow records and to 
report this analysis to the network monitoring employee. 
When a crisis occurs, for instance an external attack on 
the network monitoring activity, the normal monitoring rules 
and procedures do no longer work as usual and it is required 
to change the responsibility of the agents. For instance, if the 
attacker can perform DoS attack on a part of the network and 
those agents are out of order, other agents then have to assure 
the responsibilities of the attacked agents. Practically, if the 
probe that analyses the dataflow on a router is down, then the 
probe that analyses the flow on the IDS (Intrusion Detection 
System) can decide to analyze both, the flow on the router 
and the flow on the IDS. To meet this new responsibility 
during the attack, he requests additional access rights. 
In the current architecture, the automatic assignment of 
rights to agent depending on their responsibilities is not 
immediate and this contradicts the need to react promptly to 
the attack. 
To tackle the weakness, our approach is based on the 
refinement of the agent responsibility and on the granting of 
access rights, at the management layer, based on the 
responsibility. The right management agent exploits two 
databases accessed by the CRM agent. The first database 
contains the rights corresponding to the responsibilities and 
the second database contains a set of crisis contexts. Each 
crisis context defines, depending on the type of crisis, which 
agent is assigned which responsibility. Both databases are 
accessed by the CRM to provide rights at the operational 
layer and are managed by the Business Process Owner at the 
access right management layer. 
B. The responsibility meta-model 
The definition of the agent responsibility in ReD is 
mostly incomplete. Most of the architecture is only 
considering the agent with respect to the outcome that an 
agent has to produce. Sometimes, advanced solutions 
integrate the inputs that those agents request for performing 
the outcome. We define the responsibilities as a state 
assigned to an agent to signify him its obligations concerning 
the task, its accountabilities regarding its obligations, and the 
rights and capabilities necessary to perform it. In order to 
integrate a dynamic re-assignment of the responsibility from 
one agent working in normal condition to one agent working 
in a crisis environment, we consider all the concepts which 
compose the responsibility. In [12] we have proposed a 
model that can be used to depict the agent responsibility 
containing three sets of concepts: (i) the obligation and 
accountability, (ii) the right and capability and (iii the 
delegation and assignment process that we explain in the 
next sub-sections. 
1) Concept of obligation/accountability 
Obligation is the most frequent concept appearing  in 
literature [10] as well as in industrial and professional 
frameworks. Obligation is a duty which links a responsibility 
with a task that must be performed. We define a task as an 
action using or transforming an object. 
Accountability is a duty to provide justifications on the 
performance of a task to someone else under threat of 
sanction [13]. Accountability is a type of obligation to report 
the achievement, maintenance or avoidance of some given 
state to an authority and, as consequence, is associated to an 
obligation. 
 
Figure 2.  The Agent responsibility model 
2) Concept of right/capability 
The concept of capability describes the requisite 
qualities, skills or resources necessary to perform a task. 
Capability is a component which is part of most of the 
models and methods [14], and it may take the form of 
knowledge or know-how, possessed by the agent such as 
ability to make decision, its processing time, its faculty to 
analyze a problem, and its position on the network. 
Right (Fig. 2) is a common component but is not 
systematically included in all responsibility frameworks. 
Right encompasses facilities required by an agent to fulfill 
his obligations. We make the distinction between the pre-
assignment right which gathers rights that the agent needs to 
possess before he can be assigned a responsibility, and the 
post-assignment right (e.g. the access right) that the agent 
gets once he is assigned responsible. 
Authority describes the power or right to give orders or 
to make decisions. This concept is introduced e.g. in 
CIMOSA [15] as the power to command and control other 
human agents and to assign responsibilities. CIMOSA argues 
that responsible agents have rights over resources in the first 
place and over processes, actions and tasks in the second 
place. 
Delegation right describes the right to transfer a part of 
the responsibility to another agent who pledges commitment 
for it. Transferred responsibilities may be rights, obligations 
or both. The delegation of an obligation may or may not be 
accompanied by the delegation of the right to further 
delegate this same obligation [14]. This delegation of rights 
depends on the right’s type (access to information, money, 
time…) and on the agent’s status, function or position. This 
delegation also may or may not include the transfer of the 
related accountability [16]. 
 
3) Assignment/delegation process 
Assignment is the action of binding an agent to a 
responsibility. Delegation is the transfer of an agent’s 
responsibility assignment to another agent. The commitment 
pledged by the agent related to an assignment or delegation 
represents his engagement to meet the corresponding 
responsibility and the assurance that he does it in respect of 
good practices. This component, traditionally called 
Commitment’s antecedent in literature, corresponds to more 
pragmatic variables [17]. 
Based on the commitment outcomes and antecedent 
definitions, we may assume that an agent being committed to 
the responsibility of a task implies on the one hand an 
increase of trust in the achievement of the obligation or in 
the accountability attached to it, and on the other hand more 
efficiency (and consequently more capabilities) for this agent 
to perform the task. 
C. Agents responsibilities specifications according to the 
responsibility model 
Based on the responsibility meta-model defined in the 
above subsection B, we may instantiate the responsibility 
meta-model for each responsibilities of the network. Because 
of the size of the paper, only the four most important meta-
concepts will be instantiated here: The obligation related to 
the task, the agent towards whom the agent is responsible the 
capability, and the right. 
Table I presents the responsibilities of the ReD agents 
engineered from [2] and [4]. For the PEP, we observe that 
the responsibility include obligations such as the obligation 
to retrieve the logs from the component he monitors, to 
update the log file database, etc. To meet this obligation, he 
must have the capabilities to be on the same network as the 
component he controls and to communicate with the PDP 
and the facilitator agent. He also must have the right to read 
the log file on the concerned network component and to 
write the log in a central logs database. Finally, he is a 
towards the Head IT Operation. 
Table I summarizes the responsibilities of all agents. 
Those responsibilities conceptual components will 
afterwards be used in practice for the dynamic assignment as 
explained in section IV. 
Table I: Agents responsibilities 
 Responsibility Obligation related to the task 
Accountabl
e towards 
Capability Right 
S
O
F
T
W
A
R
E
 
PEP 
Retrieve the logs from the component he 
monitors 
Analyses the logs. 
Update the log file database 
Communicate with the facilitator the get the 
address of the other components (PDP, CRM) 
 
Head IT 
Operation 
PEP must be on the same network 
as the component to control 
PEP must be able to communicate 
with the PDP and the facilitator 
agent 
Read log file on the 
concerned network 
component 
Write log in the central 
logs database 
PDP 
Based on the incident report from the PEP, 
decide which reaction policy is appropriate to 
be deployed  
Communicate with the facilitator the get the 
address of the other components (PDP, CRM) 
Security 
Officer 
Fast bandwidth 
High CPU resources 
Central position on the network 
No specific right 
Facilitator 
Provide IT addresses of the requested 
component 
Make a mapping between the component 
name and the IP address. 
Security 
Officer 
Position in which he is always 
available 
Bandwidth depending on the 
network size 
Read and write to the 
white pages services 
database 
Read and write to the 
yellow pages services 
database 
CRM 
Provide access right on request 
Provide Crisis context information to the 
contextual specification element of the OS 
MoiseInst 
Security 
Operator 
Bandwidth depending on the 
network size 
Read and write to the 
white pages services 
database 
Read and write to the 
yellow pages services 
database 
WSIG 
Transfer policies to the PDP 
Communicate with the facilitator the get the 
address of the other components (PDP, CRM) 
Security 
Officer 
Have a position on the network 
close to the PDP 
Be on the same network as the 
servlet to be an interface between 
the servlet and the PDP 
  No specific right 
H
U
M
A
N
 
Security 
officer 
Control the Business Process Owner activity 
Monitor that logs are up to date 
Define the crisis context level 
  Directors 
  board 
Good analyses skill 
Good security experience 
Ability to make decision in a crisis   
situation 
Access to the log files 
Access to the servlet 
Network 
Monitoring 
Employee 
Control PEP activities 
Report incident to the Business Process 
Owner 
Security 
Officer 
Good technical skill 
 
Access to log files 
Access to network 
monitoring tools 
Business 
Process 
Owner 
Decide the Crisis context level 
Update Crisis context database 
Update access right database 
  Directors 
  board 
Be able to understand the business   
impact of the incident to decide the 
crisis context level 
Right to the crisis context 
Right to the right 
database 
   
IV. DYNAMIC RESPONSIBILITY ASSIGNMENT 
In this section, we illustrate, based on the ReD 
architecture, how enhancing the agent responsibilities could 
contribute to more efficiency and effectiveness in crisis 
management situations. We first introduce the ReDTopia 
component. Then, we explain how, at a technical layer, the 
responsibilities are assigned in the network based on 
specifications from the logical layer as described in Section 
III.C and how those responsibilities are dynamically 
assigned according to determined crisis levels. The transfer 
of the responsibility model to the technical layer is achieved 
in two steps: the concepts of responsibilities, capabilities, 
obligation and accountabilities are translated by the means of 
the RedTopia architecture and the concept of right is 
instantiated and operationalized according to the context by 
the CRM agent. 
A. The ReDTopia architecture 
As presented in section II, UTOPIA simplifies the 
development of Multi-Agent Systems by dynamically 
assigning responsibilities. Its main function is to assure the 
intelligent distribution of responsibilities to agents in an 
evaluative organization. The model used by UTOPIA to 
specify the organization of an Electronic Institution is 
Moise
Inst
 [10, 18]. The supervision of the agents functioning 
in that institution is supervised and controlled with a set of 
institution services regrouped in a specific normative 
middleware called SYNAI [19] on which the software 
agents are executed. 
Moise
Inst
 is an Organization Specification (OS) system 
composed by four dimensions. These four types of 
specifications are described in a XML file that creates a 
framework for specifying responsibilities and, consequently, 
for establishing the agent responsible in terms of tasks, 
obligations, rights, accountabilities and capabilities. The next 
subsections explain in details how to design those 
specifications. 
1) The Structural Specification 
The Structural Specification (Fig. 3) defines (i) the 
responsibilities which agents are assigned in the logical layer 
(ii) the relations between the responsibilities in terms of data 
exchange during the execution of the tasks. E.g. <Link 
source=”PEP-Fileserver” destination=”PDP”/> specifies 
that the PEP-Fileserver is allowed to send information to the 
PDP (iii) the Groups of agents assigned to the same 
responsibility. These groups are used by UTOPIA to regulate 
the responsibility depending on the context. E.g. In case of a 
crisis, if a PEP from a PEP group is corrupted, the 
responsibility of that failing agent is transferred to new 
agents from the same group. For example, <Responsibility 
id=”PEP” min=”3” max=”3”/> creates a PEP group with a 
cardinality sets to 3. 
 
Figure 3.  Structural Specification XML schema 
2) The Functional Specification 
The Functional Specification (FS) on Fig. 4 defines 
global business processes that can be executed by the 
different agents participating to the Organization according 
to their responsibilities and Groups. In our case, the CRM 
has to provide access rights and is accountable to report that 
task performance to the Security Operator., e.g. <TaskId 
obligation_task= ”Transfer policies to appropriate PEP” 
accountability_to=”SecurityOfficer”> PDPListen</TaskId>. 
 
Figure 4.  Functional Specification XML schema 
3) The Contextual Specification 
The Contextual Specification (CS) specifies the possible 
evolution of the organization in terms of a state/transition 
graph. E.g. for our needs we have defined two main contexts 
depending on the situation: normal or crisis and we can have 
a transition between a normal and a crisis context: 
<Transition id=”t1” source=”normal” target=”crisis 
eventId=”crisis”/> . 
 
4) The Normative Specification 
 
Figure 5.  Normative Specification XML schema 
The Normative Specification (NS) on Fig. 5 defines the 
deontic relations gluing the three independent Specifications 
(SS, FS, CS). This NS clearly states rights and duties of each 
responsibilities/Groups defined at the SS layer for tasks 
defined at of FS layer in the context of specific states from 
the CS layer. E.g. <Norm id=”N2” bearer=”PDP” 
context”normal” action”=”PDPListen”/> specifies that PDP 
agent is responsible to perform PDPListen in a normal 
situation. 
B. Example of transfer from a non-crisis to a crisis context 
To illustrate the transfer from a non-crisis to a crisis 
context, we depict the case of the PEP responsibility 
assignment to agent that, in a normal situation, is the 
following: One agent is assigned a PEP responsibility, each 
agent is associated to one component that he must monitor 
and he reports to the PDP. Each time an agent wants to 
access a component of the network (e.g. the LDAP), he 
needs to previously contact the CRM. That CRM consults 
the access rights database in order to retrieve the rights 
associated to the responsibility assigned to the agent. 
In an abnormal situation, the context evolves and an 
appropriate crisis context is selected from the Crisis context 
database. This database, which is maintained by the 
Business Process Owner, contains a set of crisis contexts. 
When the Network Monitoring employee detects a crisis, he 
refers to the Business Process Owner that sets the new 
context in order to restore the situation. Each context is 
adapted to a specific case. For example, if the crisis 
concerns the corruption of a PEP agent, a transfer of 
responsibility from the corrupted agent to another agent 
from the same group is required. This responsibility transfer 
also implies a simultaneous transfer of rights. 
The diagram of activities, as highlighted by white 
numbers in black circles on Fig. 1, is the following: 
 The CRM retrieves the new context (crisis context) 
in the context database and send it to the CS 
component of Moise
Inst
; 
 Based on the new context, Moise
Inst
 reorganizes the 
agents’ responsibilities taking into consideration the 
agent commitment to be assigned to the additional 
responsibility [20]. In that case, the new context 
requests a new deployment of the PEP 
responsibilities, such that the responsibilities of the 
PEP which is down  are transferred to agents from 
the same group; 
 The agents who receive the additional PEP 
responsibilities request access rights corresponding 
to those responsibilities to the CRM. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
Critical infrastructures are more and more present and 
needs to be seriously managed and monitor regarding the 
increasing amount of threats. In order to achieve this and to 
react when an attack occurs, we have defined a dynamic 
Multi-Agent System, which supports the reaction after an 
incident. This system, initially developed for static 
assignments of responsibility to agents, has needs for more 
dynamism to stay aligned to the new arising risks. That paper 
gives an insight about the concept of responsibility and 
addresses that new challenge by providing a framework for 
assigning responsibilities to agents depending on the crisis 
context. That contextualized responsibility assignment 
permits to dynamically manage the agent access rights. 
The paper is illustrated based on a use case that shows 
how the transfer of rights for a corrupted PEP is performed 
during an evolution from normal to crisis situation. 
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